Legitymizacja działań Światowej Organizacji Handlu  a kryzys Organu Apelacyjnego systemu rozstrzygania sporów

Wanda Dugiel; Ewa Latoszek

doi:10.35765/hp.2293

Published : 2022-06-29

Vol. 13 No. 43 (2022)

The legitimacy of the activities of the World Trade Organization and the crisis of the Appellate Body of the dispute settlement system

Wanda Dugiel

https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1369-3523

Ewa Latoszek

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2354-9536

DOI: https://doi.org/10.35765/hp.2293

Section: Articles Varia

Abstract

RESEARCH OBJECTIVE: The aim of the article is to examine the causes, effectiveness and possibilities of overcoming the crisis of the WTO dispute settlement system, including the Appellate Body, in conditions of weakening legitimacy for the functioning and acceptance of the World Trade Organization procedures.

THE RESEARCH PROBLEM AND METHODS: The article uses the qualitative and quantitative method to analyze the controversies related to the functioning of the WTO Appellate Body. The theory of international organization and the theory of public choice were used to analyze the effectiveness of the Appellate Body’s operations in the field of dispute settlement procedures between states in international trade.

THE PROCESS OF ARGUMENTATION: Based on the theory of international organization and the theory of public choice, the article discusses the issues of social legitimization for the creation and enforcement of WTO standards that allow the process of liberalization of international trade. Next, the effectiveness of the dispute settlement system, including the Appellate Body, is presented, which allowed the WTO to act in limiting protectionist actions by states.

RESEARCH RESULTS: Scientific analysis has confirmed the effectiveness of the WTO dispute settlement system in terms of liberalizing international trade. The weakening social and normative legitimacy of the dispute settlement system, including the WTO Appellate Body, as a result of reduced support for the idea of free trade in many WTO member states, in particular in the United States, made it impossible to reform WTO rules.

CONCLUSIONS, INNOVATIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS: Further analysis should be carried out on scientific research on the reform of the dispute settlement system in regional solutions without the participation of the United States. It is also necessary to examine the increase in the level of protectionism in international trade as a result of blocking the activity of the Appellate Body.

Keywords

Appellate Body ; World Trade Organization ; United States ; International Trade ; Dispute Settlement System

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