



Horyzonty Polityki
2025, Vol. 16, N° 56



CHRISTOPHER REEVES

<http://orcid.org/0000-0002-7160-6398>
Ignatianum University in Cracow
christopher.reeves@ignatianum.edu.pl

DOI: 10.35765/HP.2856

Strengthening Ties: The Deepening Defence Partnership between Poland and the US during the first Trump Administration

Abstract

RESEARCH OBJECTIVE: To explain why defence co-operation between the Polish and American governments deepened during the first Trump administration (2017-2021), despite the US president's "America First" agenda.

THE RESEARCH PROBLEM AND METHODS: The article places Polish-US relations in a wider context by considering the evolution of relations before Trump's victory and the broader foreign policy agenda of his administration. It assesses the degree to which the new US administration represented a departure from its predecessors and the implications for Poland's diplomacy. Using qualitative materials, including official records, newspaper reports, and academic literature, it elucidates the factors that allowed Polish officials to overcome the US administration's isolationist inclinations and conclude the Enhanced Defence Co-operation Agreement in 2020.

THE PROCESS OF ARGUMENTATION: The article considers factors that allowed Polish policymakers to deepen the bilateral defence partnership with the US, including the similar worldviews of Polish and US officials and the significant amount that Poland spent on defence.

RESEARCH RESULTS: Polish officials cultivated close relations with their US counterparts and appealed to the US president's populist instincts, securing three bilateral declarations that committed both governments to deepening their

Suggested citation: Reeves, C. (2025). Strengthening Ties: The Deepening Defence Partnership between Poland and the US during the first Trump Administration. *Horizons of Politics*, 16(56), 349–365. DOI: 10.35765/HP.2856.

defence partnership, which laid the foundations for the 2020 Enhanced Defence Co-operation Agreement.

CONCLUSIONS, INNOVATIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS: Polish officials successfully concluded a Defence Agreement that built upon previous US commitments at the 2014 and 2016 NATO summits, significantly increasing the US military presence in Poland. There were, however, financial and diplomatic costs in aligning closely with the Trump administration. Future considerations should include the impact on relations with Poland's European partners when aligning Poland so closely with a populist US administration.

KEYWORDS:

Poland, United States, Trump, defence co-operation, partnership

I. INTRODUCTION

Donald Trump's 2016 shock election victory forced many governments around the world to re-examine their relations with the United States. Nowhere was this more evident than in Europe, not least because the Trump campaign slogan, "America First", was redolent with isolationist sentiments, which strongly suggested that the incoming administration would want to put some distance between itself and its allies in Europe and Asia (*Economist*, 2016). Yet in the years that followed, the Polish government managed to strengthen significantly its defence partnership with the United States. Beginning in September 2018, during a visit to the White House, Presidents Duda and Trump signed a Declaration of Strategic Partnership that committed both countries to deepening co-operation in several areas, including defence, energy, and trade and investment (Duda & Trump, 2018). The following year, two more bilateral Declarations were issued, the first at the White House in June (Duda & Trump, 2019a) and a second in New York (Duda & Trump, 2019b), both of which provided more detail regarding how the US military presence in Poland was to be augmented. These Declarations formed the basis of the Enhanced Defence Co-operation Agreement that the US Secretary of Defense, Mike Pompeo, and the Polish Defence Minister, Mariusz Błaszczak, signed on 15 August 2020, which, among other

things, resulted in the then US force of around 4500 personnel being increased by an additional thousand, and the Forward Command of the US Army V Corps was also to be based in the Poznań area (Błaszczak, 2020). The sum total of these Declarations and the Agreement meant that, as President Trump's first term drew to a close, the US had significantly increased its military presence on Polish territory. This article will seek to explain this apparent paradox: the fact that the Polish-American defence partnership deepened, despite the isolationist inclinations of the Trump administration. It will argue that several factors contributed to this outcome, including similar worldviews of the governments in Warsaw and Washington at that time, and that Polish officials proved adept at managing relations with their US counterparts. It will further argue, however, that there were costs – both financial and diplomatic – in aligning Poland so closely with the Trump administration.

The article will draw on a wide range of qualitative materials, including the official records of both the US and Polish governments, newspaper reports, and the academic literature on both the foreign and security policies of the US and Poland. The first part of the article will briefly consider how Polish-US relations have evolved after Russia annexed Crimea in 2014. The second, more substantial part will consider how the Trump administration's approach to Europe affected Poland, and will consider some of the factors that contributed to the deepening of the defence partnership. The final part will offer some concluding remarks regarding the benefits and costs of this partnership.

II. POLISH-US RELATIONS IN THE PRE-TRUMP ERA

Polish-American relations were relatively unsettled even before President Trump's arrival at the White House. In the 1990s and early 2000s, successive Polish governments had attempted to cultivate a close, if not "special", relationship with the United States. In the decade after 1989, NATO membership was one of the primary goals of Poland's foreign policy elite (Cottey, 1995, pp. 39–40). After Poland joined NATO in 1999, Polish officials were anxious to demonstrate that they could contribute positively to the Alliance, and the government's

unvarnished Atlanticism became a particularly prominent feature of its foreign and security policies. By the late 2000s, however, Poland's national security strategy began to retrench, with much greater emphasis placed on territorial defence and a more sceptical attitude towards overseas military deployments (Lanoszka, 2015, p. 141; Paszewski, 2016, pp. 125–126). The new defence posture reflected the deteriorating security environment in Europe after 2008, with the outbreak of the Russo-Georgian War. Russia's sudden seizure of Crimea and its support for the pro-Russian separatist insurgency in Ukraine's Donbas region early in 2014. At the September 2014 NATO Summit held in Newport, Wales, the Alliance agreed, among other things, to strengthen NATO's Response Force, which was to be spearheaded by a Very-High Readiness Joint Task Force (Fryc, 2016).

In the spring of 2015, *Prawo i Sprawiedliwość* (Law and Justice) won a slim majority in Poland's parliamentary elections and captured the presidency. Political scientists have emphasised the party's populist tendencies, with one suggesting that its DNA 'can be described as conservative, nativist, and illiberal' (Cadier, 2021, p. 708). The new government's foreign policy also began to attract a great deal of scrutiny, not least because of its commitment to pursuing a "historical policy" in that the government sought to promote "a set of interpretations of past events" which were the 'correct understandings of [the] nation's historical experiences' (Wawrzyński, 2017, p. 297). This approach impinged on the state's foreign policy, which was largely aimed at achieving redress for the historical wrongs that Poland had experienced at the hands of neighbouring states, particularly Germany and Ukraine (Cadier & Szulecki, 2020). In 2018 the Polish government passed a so-called "memory law" that threatened to press criminal charges against anyone who accused the "Polish nation" of complicity with Nazi crimes. The Israeli government strongly opposed the law, and the US government supported their stance, which resulted in a suspension of meetings between the US and Polish presidents until the law was amended (Bill, 2022, pp. 129–130; Cadier, 2021, p. 710). Yet in terms of how the Polish government perceived the security situation in Europe and the role of the United States, there was no fundamental break from its predecessor. The new government was clear – in marked contrast to its Hungarian counterpart – that Russia represented a clear threat to European security and that the

United States continued to play a critical role as a security provider in Europe's security structures. Indeed, President Duda argued for what he termed "Newport Plus", in that NATO needed to strengthen its presence in Central and Eastern Europe as a means of deterring potential future Russian aggression. At the NATO Summit convened in Warsaw in 2016, the government made significant progress when the Alliance agreed to establish what came to be termed as an Enhanced Forward Presence in the region. This involved strengthening NATO's military footprint in the Baltic states, Poland and Romania by establishing four battalion-sized Battlegroups in the Baltic states and Poland, each of which was to be led by a Framework Nation (the United States, the UK, Canada, and Germany) (Lanoszka & Hunzeker, 2023). While the Enhanced Forward Presence, as it came to be known, was from the Polish perspective certainly welcome, it still fell some way short of the permanent US military presence on Poland's territory for which many of its policymakers had long yearned.

III. THE DEEPENING OF THE US-POLISH DEFENCE PARTNERSHIP

Donald Trump's presidential campaign indicated that there would be a significant change to both the substance and style of US diplomacy were he to be elected. Various scholars have attempted to delineate the main elements of the Trump administration's foreign policy during his first term, including the transactional nature of its approach to diplomacy and its deep-seated aversion to overseas commitments (Desmaele, 2022, p. 187; Dombrowski & Reich, 2017, p. 1026; Kaufman, 2017, pp. 263–264; Macdonald, 2018, p. 409; Nye, 2017, p. 12; Snyder, 2024, p. 87; Steff & Tidwell, 2020, p. 396; Stokes, 2018, pp. 133–137). The arrival of the Trump administration posed significant challenges for Europe, as the new president withdrew from key initiatives like the Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA) and the Paris Accords (Desmaele, 2022, p. 187; Snyder, 2024, p. 90), and expressed a dismissive attitude towards NATO, describing the Alliance as "obsolete" in one interview shortly before he assumed office (Kaufman, 2017, p. 251). In an address given at the opening of the new NATO headquarters in Brussels, the new president pointedly chose not to

refer to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, and would repeatedly excoriate his European Allies for not contributing enough financially to Europe's defence (Desmaele, 2022, p. 191).

On the face of it, these seemed to be inauspicious circumstances for a deepening of the US-Polish defence partnership. The reaction of President Duda to Trump's 2016 victory was revealing. While sending, as diplomatic protocol dictated, his warmest congratulations to the president-elect, the Polish president was also careful to note the outcome of the NATO Summit in Warsaw a few months earlier and how pleased the government was that "the U.S. decided to increase its military presence in Poland, thereby strengthening the Alliance's Eastern flank" (Duda, 2016). The Polish foreign minister, Witold Waszczykowski, also stated that getting the incoming US administration to reaffirm the commitments made at the Warsaw Summit was a priority for the government (*Defence24*, 2016). This initial response indicated that, regardless of the ideological similarities between PiS and Trump's Republican Party, there were some underlying concerns regarding the new president's attitude towards NATO. A combination of the president's disparaging public comments about NATO and his stated desire to improve relations with Vladimir Putin's Russia must have created a sense of unease among Polish policymakers (Lyman, 2016). Indeed, the vision of Great Powers formulating deals at Poland's expense has been a continuing concern for Polish policymakers over decades, if not centuries (Prizel, 1998, p. 110).

It is therefore notable that the defence partnership between Poland and the United States actually deepened during the Trump administration. A major step in this direction was taken when President Duda visited the White House in September 2019, and the two presidents issued a joint declaration that was titled "Safeguarding Freedom, Building Prosperity", which was long on diplomatic platitudes and markedly short on actual detail, and is chiefly remembered for the unflattering official photo that captured the signing of the Declaration, which had the Polish president leaning on the Resolute Desk while his American counterpart was sitting behind it (Szymczyk, 2018). While this Declaration was largely symbolic, it did reaffirm both countries' continued commitment to upholding Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which was of considerable importance for the Polish government. It was also during this White House meeting that

President Duda publicly floated the idea of a permanent US military base on Polish soil which – in an obvious effort to appeal to his counterpart’s love of branding – he suggested should be named Fort Trump. While the US president did not publicly accept this suggestion, he did not overtly reject it either. Two further Declarations were issued the following year that contained more substantial commitments, and which were solidified with the signing of the Enhanced Defence Co-operation Agreement in August 2020. Some of the key elements within the agreement were the stationing of the European Forward Command of the US Army’s V Corps close to Poznań, the deployment of a rotationally-present armoured brigade in in Żagań-Świętoszów, and the establishment of a Polish-US Combat Training Centre in Drawsko Pomorskie. As part of the agreement, the Polish government also committed itself improving infrastructure, which would allow for, should the circumstances require it, the reinforcement of the US military presence in Poland of up to 20,000 troops. The costs of the Agreement were not specified, though an estimate of approximately \$500 million per annum was presented (*Defence24*, 2020).

It can be argued that the securing of the EDCA was a significant achievement for the PiS government, particularly given the semi-isolationist instincts of senior policymakers in the Trump administration. It will be argued that several factors contributed to the solidification of the US-Polish defence partnership. The first is that, from the moment President Trump assumed office, Poland’s PiS government assumed an overtly pro-American posture. This in itself was nothing new: Poland’s unvarnished Atlanticism has been a consistent feature of every government’s foreign policy since 1989. It has been argued that Polish policymakers perceived an international order “in which the United States is a unipolar power that seeks to retain military primacy” as being in Poland’s best interests (Lanoszka, 2020, p. 463). A militarily dominant United States is widely seen as Poland’s best guarantee *vis-à-vis* a threatening Russia. It could be argued that Poland’s Atlanticism is so ingrained into the prevailing strategic culture of its policymaking community that almost any government, whatever its political complexion, would have pursued a pro-American foreign policy, regardless of who was occupying the White House. It has been noted that of Poland’s two largest political

parties – *Platforma Obywatelska* and PiS – the latter “prefers cooperation with Washington, even at the expense of relationships with Western European partners like Berlin or Paris” (Lanoszka, 2020, p. 461). Hence, it was hardly surprising that the Warsaw government was prepared to go to considerable lengths to strengthen its bilateral partnership with the incoming Trump administration.

This could be seen when the Polish Foreign Ministry secured an early diplomatic triumph by arranging for the new US president to visit Poland from 5 to 6 July 2017. It was reported that the then Polish foreign minister, Witold Waszczykowski, no doubt mindful that the US president tended to bask in acclamation, gave assurances to the White House that the president was guaranteed an enthusiastic reception in Warsaw (MAW, 2017). Whilst in Warsaw the US president attended the second summit meeting of the recently established Three Seas Initiative. This, from the vantage point of the Polish Foreign Ministry, was a major diplomatic coup. The Initiative was at the centre of the Polish government’s diplomatic strategy towards Central and Eastern Europe and, indeed, bore more than a passing resemblance to Józef Piłsudski’s *Intermarium* in the interwar period (Pizzolo, 2024, pp. 873–874). The culmination of the visit an address the US president gave in Krasiński Square, where he did indeed receive a rapturous reception, which was helped by the fact that a large number of PiS supporters from around Poland were bussed in by the party (MAW, 2017). In his address Trump finally affirmed his commitment to Article 5 of NATO. More controversially, the US president appeared to equate the 1944 Warsaw Rising with the West’s current defence of its values against external enemies (which included a rare criticism of Vladimir Putin’s Russia), and even “the steady creep of government bureaucracy that drains the vitality and wealth of the people” (Trump, 2017). Overall, from the Polish government’s perspective, the US president’s first visit to Poland appeared to be a major success and laid the groundwork for closer Polish and American ties in the future.

The ideological similarities of the two governments in Washington and Warsaw in this period were almost certainly an important factor in the Trump administration’s willingness to strengthen its bilateral partnership with the PiS government. Unlike many of its Western European partners, the Warsaw government did not view with disquiet

the populist inclinations of the new president. Indeed, in many areas, the two governments pursued similar political agendas, such as adopting a tougher attitude towards LGBTQ rights and hardening their states' frontiers to reduce immigration flows into their respective countries. President Trump's signature promise was to "build a wall" along the US-Mexican frontier; in Poland, the government was similarly committed to intensifying the policing of its frontiers, particularly its border with Belarus, to prevent migrants (many of whom originated in the North Caucasus and Asia, and which the Belarussian government was trafficking as a form of hybrid warfare) from entering into the country (Grabau, 2024, pp. 243–245). Furthermore, the leadership in both Washington and Warsaw had a profoundly Realist view of international relations, perceiving the great powers as relentlessly pursuing their interests at the expense of weaker states, and believing that international institutions could, at best, have only a limited impact on constraining their behaviour. In this regard, both the Trump administration and PiS evinced deep scepticism that the EU could be an effective strategic actor within the international system (Desmaele, 2022, pp. 191–192). From Warsaw's perspective, there has been little enthusiasm for the notion of a European defence policy, not least because it was felt that it could potentially duplicate NATO's structures (Lanoszka, 2020, p. 463). The similar worldviews of policymakers in Washington and Warsaw meant that, unlike many of its Western European neighbours, the Polish government had few qualms when it came to supporting the Trump administration's foreign policy agenda. In 2019, for instance, Poland hosted at the behest of the US an international conference on Iran as an international problem (Sieradzka, 2019).

Another common element in both the foreign policies of the US and Poland at this time was a deep suspicion of Germany's role within the European Union. President Trump's antipathy for Germany's Chancellor, Angela Merkel, was all too apparent shortly after he assumed office. In their first meeting at the Oval Office in March 2017, the president, despite prompting, did not shake the Chancellor's hand (Henderson, 2017). The leadership of PiS had also long harboured suspicions about the German government and believed that it should pay reparations for the Second World War. Furthermore, whereas the previous Polish government, whose foreign minister,

Radosław Sikorski, had expressed concern about the lack of leadership from Berlin (Taras, 2015, p. 135), the new PiS government was deeply suspicious of the degree of influence that the German government wielded in European affairs. The Trump administration also believed that Germany used its influence within the EU “to push other countries in the wrong direction”, in that it continued to maintain a working relationship with Moscow and remained committed to the Nord Stream 2 pipeline project, thereby only strengthening Germany’s energy dependence on Russia (Desmaele, 2022, p. 185). Successive Polish governments had also expressed deep-seated concerns regarding Nord Stream, viewing it as a potential means for Russian energy blackmail, given that the pipeline circumvented Polish territory (Handl et al., 2023, p. 512; Lanoszka, 2020, p. 468). Another reason for the Trump administration’s antipathy was the German government’s relatively low level of defence spending, which by 2018 was little more than 1.2% of GDP, considerably less than the NATO target of 2% (Tigner, 2019).

In contrast to Germany, Poland in 2017 had already met NATO’s defence spending target of 2% of GDP, and this was projected to increase to 2.5% by 2030 (Palczewska, 2021, p. 91). The sudden hike in Poland’s defence expenditure was, of course, largely a consequence of the deterioration of Europe’s security environment since Russia’s incursions into Ukraine in 2014. Yet, given that President Trump openly judged his European allies based on their willingness to spend on defence, this could only serve to reinforce the president’s favourable impression of Poland. Even more significantly, much of this spending went on procuring US weapons systems, the most prominent of which was the government’s decision to purchase 32 F-35 aircraft for \$4.6 billion. This decision attracted some criticism because the aircraft was ill-suited for Poland’s defensive strategy, given that they are primarily designed for pre-emptive strikes against enemy targets. Moreover, there were concerns that the Polish military would be unable to fully exploit the technological potential of the aircraft, with one newspaper likening it to purchasing “the latest smartphone in a place where only an outdated analogue network operates” (Kociszewski, 2020). The government’s decision was, however, hardly unprecedented. In the early 2000s, the Polish government accepted a \$3.8 billion loan from the US Congress to order 48 F-16 fighters

(Zaborowski & Longhurst, 2003, p. 1011). Some of these deals attracted controversy, with one opposition politician arguing that Poland had “ceased to be a partner of the United States” and had instead “become a subcontractor willing to overpay for military equipment, raw materials, and so buy the attention of American politicians” (Pudłowski, 2019). It is highly likely, however, that, given the US president’s penchant for deal-making, Polish policymakers were more than aware that the purchase of US weapons systems was likely to have a salutary effect on bilateral relations with the United States. In this way, Polish policymakers proved adept at exploiting the US president’s transactional approach to diplomacy.

The Polish government’s decision to align itself so closely with the Trump administration had its costs, both financial and diplomatic. The government, for instance, was hesitant to disclose the full financial implications of the EDCA, though estimates suggested an annual cost of approximately \$500 million. These, however, seemingly excluded the infrastructure expenses required to support the deployment. Further concerns were raised regarding the transfer of several Polish military facilities to U.S. control, including an airbase at Powidz and part of the training ground in Drawsko Pomorskie, which were accompanied by extraterritorial rights that effectively restricted Polish access to them. Perhaps the most controversial aspect of the Agreement was the provision exempting US forces from Polish jurisdiction, even if they committed crimes that were unrelated to their military duties. Critics noted that this represented a departure from agreements that previous Polish governments had made with the United States (Majmurek, 2020). A few months after the Polish *Sejm* ratified the Agreement, opposition politicians continued to express their concerns regarding the government’s unwillingness to disclose fully the costs of the Agreement and the limited jurisdiction that the Polish authorities would have over US military forces deployed in Poland (Komisja Obrony Narodowej, 2021).

The Polish government also paid a diplomatic price for aligning itself so closely with the Trump administration, in that it further strained relations with several of its European partners, notably Germany. It was notable, for instance, that a few days before the signing of the EDCA, the Trump administration unilaterally announced that it planned to withdraw 9,500 troops from Germany, seemingly as

a punishment for the German government's failure to meet NATO's target on defence spending. The US president indicated that a proportion of them might be redeployed to Poland, whilst others would be sent to other NATO states or would return to the United States. While from Warsaw's vantage point, the prospect of additional US forces on Polish territory was welcome, Polish policymakers were almost certainly aware that the decision could potentially have a deleterious impact on bilateral relations with Berlin. One commentator noted, for instance, that the redeployment "could also create political strains within the Alliance by suggesting that the United States is more committed to Poland's security than to Germany's" (Golden, 2020). It seems that President Trump's sudden announcement also caught the Polish government off balance, as they had received no advance warning about the announcement, and it was not immediately clear how the additional US forces would be accommodated (Schultz, 2020). Moreover, an absolute reduction in US forces on the European continent – even if some were to be redeployed to Poland – was clearly inimical to Poland's security interests. In reaction to the Trump administration's announcement, President Duda called upon the US president not to reduce the size of the US military presence on the European continent (Golden, 2020). Furthermore, Paul Taylor (2018, p. 13) has noted that aligning so closely with the Trump administration was "a risky strategy, given the US leader's unpredictability, uncertain duration in office and ambiguity towards NATO and Russia," particularly given the "long-term shift in Washington's strategic priorities from Europe to Asia. The Trump administration sees China, not Russia, as the main long-term strategic threat." Just as the Obama administration partially disengaged from European affairs with its pivot towards Asia, there were clearly risks with being overly dependent on an even more capricious US president.

IV. CONCLUSION

The article has attempted to explain how the Polish government deepened its defence partnership with the Trump administration, despite the US president's scepticism regarding overseas commitments and his negative attitude towards NATO. It has been argued that several

factors contributed to this deepening of the defence partnership. The similar worldviews of the two governments, which perceived international politics as a competitive system over which great powers dominated was one factor. A mutual scepticism of multilateral institutions, and a particular mistrust of Germany's role within the EU was also important. The fact that Poland was one of the few European states to meet NATO's defence spending target of 2% of GDP, and that the Polish government was willing to conclude several important arms deals with the US were also important for deepening the partnership. Moreover, Polish officials also proved particularly adept at managing their relations with the administration, which was no small feat given the capricious nature of the US president's personality. In retrospect, President Trump's 2017 visit to Warsaw provided the basis on which the future defence arrangements rested. Aside from a brief hiccup in relations in 2018, as a result of the so-called "memory law", relations between the two governments remained close. The Enhanced Defence Co-operation Agreement can therefore be judged as a significant success for Polish diplomacy. It effectively cemented the US military's presence on Polish territory, and it is notable that, for the most part, it received support across Poland's political spectrum. In order to achieve this, however, the Polish government had to make several significant concessions, including bearing a large share of the costs, relinquishing control over several military bases, and severely circumscribing judicial authority over US troops deployed in Poland. The Polish government's close alignment with the Trump administration also strained relations with its European partners, especially the German government. It can be further argued that there were risks in tying Poland's security so closely with the Trump administration, particularly given the president's antipathy towards NATO and his desire to improve relations with Vladimir Putin's Russia.

REFERENCES

- Bill, S. (2022). Counter-Elite Populism and Civil Society in Poland: PiS's Strategies of Elite Replacement. *East European Politics and Societies: And Cultures*, 36(1), 118–140.
- Błaszczak, M. (2020, 15th August). *New U.S.-Poland Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement signed*. Ministry of National Defence. <https://>

- www.gov.pl/web/national-defence/new-us-poland-enhanced-defence-cooperation-agreement-signed (accessed on 18th March 2023).
- Cadier, D. (2021). Populist Politics of Representation and Foreign Policy: Evidence from Poland. *Comparative European Politics*, 19(6), 703–721.
- Cadier, D., & Szulecki, K. (2020). Populism, Historical Discourse and Foreign Policy: The Case of Poland's Law and Justice Government. *International Politics*, 57(6), 990–1011.
- Cottey, A. (1995). *East-Central Europe after the Cold War: Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary in Search of Security*. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
- Defence24 (2016, 9th November). Donald Trump prezydentem USA. Polska oczekuje potwierdzenia gwarancji bezpieczeństwa. <https://defence24.pl/donald-trump-prezydentem-usa-polska-oczekuje-potwierdzenia-gwarancji-bezpieczenstwa> (accessed on 23th April 2023).
- Defence24 (2020, 14th August). *Defence24 Reveals Details of the Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement*. <https://defence24.com/defence24-reveals-details-of-the-enhanced-defence-cooperation-agreement-exclusive> (accessed on 18th March 2023).
- Desmaele, L. (2022). Unpacking the Trump Administration's Grand Strategy in Europe: Power Maximisation, Relative Gains and Sovereignty. *European Security*, 31(2), 180–199. DOI: 10.1080/09662839.2021.1987224
- Dombrowski, P., & Reich, S. (2017). Does Donald Trump have a Grand Strategy? *International Affairs*, 93(5), 1013–1037. DOI: 10.1093/ia/iix161
- Duda, A. (2016, 9th November). *President Duda's letter to His Excellency Donald Trump*. <https://www.president.pl/news/president-dudas-letter-to-his-excellency-donald-trump,36258> (accessed on 23th April 2023).
- Duda, A., & Trump, D. (2018, 18th September). *Safeguarding freedom, building prosperity through Poland-US Strategic Partnership*. <https://www.president.pl/news/safeguarding-freedom-building-prosperity-through-poland-us-strategic-partnership,36807> (accessed on 18th March 2023).
- Duda, A., & Trump, D. (2019a, 12th June). *Joint Declaration on Defense Cooperation Regarding U.S. Force Posture in Poland*. <https://www.president.pl/news/joint-declaration-on-defense-cooperation-regarding-us-force-posture-in-the-republic-of-poland,37016> (accessed on 23th April 2023).
- Duda, A., & Trump, D. (2019b, 24th September) *Joint Declaration on Advancing Defense Cooperation – Poland in NATO*. <https://www.gov.pl/web/nato-en/joint-declaration-on-advancing-defense-cooperation> (accessed on 18th March 2023).

- Economist* (2016, 17th December). Allies and interests: Pax Trumpiana. *The Economist*, 421(9020).
- Fryc, M. (2016). From Wales to Warsaw and Beyond: NATO's Strategic Adaptation to the Russian Resurgence on Europe's Eastern Flank. *Connections: The Quarterly Journal*, 15(4), 45–65. DOI: 10.11610/Connections.15.4.03
- Golden, K. (2020, 25th June). What's at Stake in Trump's Plans to Withdraw Troops from Germany. <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/whats-at-stake-in-trumps-plans-to-withdraw-troops-from-germany/> (accessed on 23th April 2023).
- Graban, A. (2024). Instrumentalisation of Fear and Securitisation of "Eastern Borders Route": The Case of Poland-Belarus "Border Crisis". *European Security*, 33(2), 236–260. DOI: 10.1080/09662839.2023.2287499
- Handl, V., Nigrin, T., & Mejstřík, M. (2023). Turnabout or Continuity? The German *Zeitenwende* and the Reaction of the V4 Countries to it. *Journal of European Integration*, 45(3), 503–519. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2023.2190110>
- Henderson, B. (2017, 18th March). Trump Refuses Handshake with Guest Merkel: American President – Who Held Hands with Theresa May – Gives Icy Welcome to German Leader. *The Daily Telegraph*.
- Kaufman, J.P. (2017). The US Perspective on NATO under Trump: Lessons of the Past and Prospects for the Future. *International Affairs*, 93(2), 251–266. DOI: 10.1093/ia/iix009
- Kociszewski, J. (2020, 7th February). Polska nie jest w stanie wykorzystać F-35. <https://www.newsweek.pl/polska/f-35-dlaczego-gigantyczna-inwestycja-praktycznie-nie-ma-sensu/2nv97cl> (accessed on 18th March 2023).
- Komisja Obrony Narodowej (2021, 10th March). *Komisja Obrony Narodowej: Informację na temat pobytu wojsk amerykańskich i sojusznicznych na terytorium Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej oraz realizowanych na ich potrzeby inwestycji wojskowych*. 10 March 2021. <https://www.sejm.gov.pl/sejm9.nsf/biuletyn.xsp?documentId=A29C5110DFBEF388C12586990035A-B0A> (accessed on 18th March 2023).
- Lanoszka, A. (2015). Do Allies Really Free Ride? *Survival*, 57(3), 133–152. DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2015.1046229
- Lanoszka, A. (2020). Poland in a Time of Geopolitical Flux. *Contemporary Politics*, 26(4), 458–474. DOI: 10.1080/13569775.2020.1777042
- Lanoszka, A., & Hunzeker, M.A. (2023). Evaluating the Enhanced Forward Presence After Five Years. *The RUSI Journal*, 168(1-2), 88–97. DOI: 10.1080/03071847.2023.2190352

- Lyman, R. (2016, 20th November). Enthusiasm for Trump in Poland Is Tempered by Distrust of Putin. *New York Times, Late Edition (East Coast)*.
- Macdonald, P.K. (2018). America First? Explaining Continuity and Change in Trump's Foreign Policy. *Political Science Quarterly*, 133(3), 401–434. DOI: 10.1002/polq.12804
- Majmurek, J. (2020, 4th August). Czy za obecność amerykańskich żołnierzy PiS zgodzi się na wszystko? <https://www.newsweek.pl/opinie/umowa-o-stacjonowaniu-zolnierzy-usa-na-jakie-ustepstwa-zgodzi-la-sie-polska/m4gl73c> (accessed on 23th April 2023).
- MAW (2017, 13th June). Czym Polska skusiła Trumpa? By doszło do wizyty MSZ musiał zadeklarować... entuzjastyczne powitanie. (2017). *Newsweek Polska*. <https://www.newsweek.pl/polska/polityka/wizyta-donald-trumpa-czym-polska-dyplomacja-skusila-prezydenta-usa/kc8wwwm> (accessed on 18th March 2023).
- Nye, J. (2017). Will the Liberal Order Survive? The History of an Idea. *Foreign Affairs*, 96(1), 10–16.
- Palczewska, M. (2021). The Security Perception and Security Policy of Poland, 1989–2017. *Defense & Security Analysis*, 37(1), 80–95. DOI: 10.1080/14751798.2020.1831237
- Paszewski, T. (2016). Can Poland Defend Itself? *Survival*, 58(2), 117–134. DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2016.1161907
- Pizzolo, P. (2024). The Geopolitical Role of the Three Seas Initiative: Mackinder's 'Middle Tier' Strategy Redux. *Europe-Asia Studies*, 76(6), 873–890. DOI: 10.1080/09668136.2023.2250106
- Prizel, I. (1998). *National Identity and Foreign Policy: Nationalism and Leadership in Poland, Russia and Ukraine*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Pudłowski, P. (2019, 14th March). Wypowiedzi na posiedzeniach Sejmu: Posiedzenie nr 78 w dniu 14-03-2019 (2. Dzień obrad). https://www.sejm.gov.pl/sejm8.nsf/wypowiedz.xsp?posiedzenie=78&dzien=2&wyp=13&symbol=RWYSTAPIENIA_WYP&id=315 (accessed on 23th April 2023).
- Schultz, T. (2020, 2nd July). What Poland Wants When it Comes to US troops. <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/what-poland-wants-when-it-comes-to-us-troops/> (accessed on 23th April 2023).
- Sieradzka, M. (2019, 14th February). US Demands EU Allies Leave Iran Nuclear Deal. <https://www.dw.com/en/poland-us-hold-controversial-middle-east-conference-in-warsaw/a-47512354> (accessed on 18th March 2023).

- Snyder, R.S. (2024). Realist or Just Anti-Liberal? Trump's Foreign Policy in Retrospect. *International Journal: Canada's Journal of Global Policy Analysis*, 79(1), 79–95. DOI: 10.1177/00207020241234245
- Steff, R., & Tidwell, A. (2020). Understanding and Evaluating Trump's Foreign Policy: A Three Frame Analysis. *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 74(4), 394–419. DOI: 10.1080/10357718.2020.1721431
- Stokes, D. (2018). Trump, American Hegemony and the Future of the Liberal International Order. *International Affairs*, 94(1), 133–150. DOI: 10.1093/ia/iix238
- Szymczyk, M. (2018, 19th September). Ekspert od protokołu dyplomatycznego: Andrzej Duda stanął nad Trumpem jak uczeń. <https://www.newsweek.pl/swiat/ekspert-od-protokolu-dyplomatycznego-andrzej-duda-stanal-nad-trumpem-jak-uczen/bndvfvf5> (accessed on 18th March 2023).
- Taras, R. (2015). *Fear and the Making of Foreign Policy: Europe and Beyond*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Taylor, P. (2018). 'Fort Trump' or Bust? "Poland and the Future of European Defence". <https://www.friendsofeurope.org/insights/fort-trump-or-bust-poland-and-the-future-of-european-defence/> (accessed on 18th March 2023).
- Tigner, B. (2019, 13th February). Can Germany Stay the Course on Defense Spending? <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/can-germany-stay-the-course-on-defense-spending/> (accessed on 18th April 2023).
- Trump, D. (2017, 6th July). *Remarks by President Trump to the People of Poland*. <https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-people-poland/> (accessed on 18th March 2023).
- Wawrzyński, P. (2017). The Government's Remembrance Policy: Five Theoretical Hypotheses. *Polish Political Science Yearbook*, 46(1), 294–312. DOI: 10.15804/ppsy2017119
- Zaborowski, M., & Longhurst, K. (2003). America's Protégé in the East? The Emergence of Poland as a Regional Leader. *International Affairs*, 79(5), 1009–1028. DOI: 10.1046/j.1468-2346.2003.00351.x

Copyright and License



This article is published under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution – NoDerivs (CC BY- ND 4.0) License
<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/>