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EU Collective Assistance to Ukrainian Self-Defence: Forms and Means of A New Kind of European Security Policy Response

Abstract

RESEARCH OBJECTIVE: The research objective of this article is to explore the defining features of EU assistance to Ukraine by means of previously untested forms of collective action.

THE RESEARCH PROBLEM AND METHODS: EU members took various national measures in response to the Russian aggression against Ukraine. In addition to support from EU members, an unprecedented modality of collective military assistance emerged in the practice of the European Union following February 2022. The nature, various aspects and purpose of this novel course of EU foreign and security policy action will be examined and identified mainly on the basis of EU acts and documents as primary sources of explanatory relevance for the understanding of both the objectives and the chosen means of implementation.

THE PROCESS OF ARGUMENTATION: After a brief review of coordinated military assistance from outside the EU and non-military aid from the Union, the mobilization of the European Peace Facility (EPF) is examined as a specific financial instrument of military assistance. For the proper identification of the nature and scope of EU defence aid to Ukraine, it is explained how the EU initiated and covered the costs of military training activities and transfers of various military assets through recourse to the EPF.

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RESEARCH RESULTS: All forms of defence aid have been decided upon jointly and mostly financed from the EPF as a particular tool of collective burden-sharing. Therefore, EU defence support to Ukraine has been carried out as collective assistance because of the nature of its approval and financial resources underlying the transfer of equipment and training activities.

CONCLUSIONS, INNOVATIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS: The EPF has served as a useful vehicle for the “mutualisation” of financial costs and the coordination of military hardware and “software” (skills and knowledge) transfers from EU Member States into collectively funded assistance for Ukrainian self-defence.

KEYWORDS:

military assistance, European Peace Facility, transfer of equipment, training mission, Ukraine Assistance Fund

INTRODUCTION

After the launch of the open Russian aggression against Ukraine, the European Union has adopted altogether 13 rounds of various (sectoral and targeted) sanctions as countermeasures, provided non-military (economic, financial and humanitarian) aid and taken military assistance measures in support of Ukrainian war efforts. EU sanctions were already imposed following the first phase of the Russian aggression in 2014, but no EU orchestrated or facilitated defence aid was offered to Ukraine before 2022. Only in the wake of the outbreak of the full-scale war in Ukraine, the EU arrived at the decision to formulate a new kind of collective security policy response by means of military assistance to help the exercise of Ukrainian self-defence. As a recently emerged phenomenon in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) practice of the European Union, the defining characteristics, forms and means of actual collective EU defence assistance need to be examined to understand and identify their nature and objectives.

Even if the focus is directed on the issues of defence assistance coordinated and financed through EU institutions, the examination begins with a brief overview of non-military EU assistance intended to bolster the viability of the Ukrainian state during and in the aftermath of its current struggle. Before the examination and overview of the

means and forms of EU collective defence assistance, the legal status and qualification international military aid to Ukraine will be briefly clarified. For the understanding of the nature and modalities of EU collective assistance to Ukrainian self-defence, the functions of the European Peace Facility (EPF) as the recently introduced particular EU financial instrument and its role in the current manifestations of collective EU military assistance have to be identified. Then, the main features of both modalities of defence aid to Ukraine orchestrated and financed through the European Union will be explained as different, but complementary forms of assistance facilitated by the use of EPF. The examination of the adopted arrangements for collective EU military assistance will conclude with a summary of its current relevance.

Throughout the article, the examination and analysis of the subject matter represent the result of an original research. The observations and explanations are predominantly (with a few exceptions of news or think-thank reports) based on the primary sources of information in the form of legal acts and decisions, statements and announcements, factsheets and press releases from the European Union and/or national authorities of various states inside or outside the EU. No related and publicly available relevant academic output on the theme of this article could be identified and used for the elaboration of the presented study.

1. NON-MILITARY, BUT COLLECTIVE ASSISTANCE FROM THE EU AND ITS MEMBER STATES FOR CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT AND SURVIVAL IN TIMES OF SELF-DEFENCE

Collective assistance to a victim of aggression may be provided not only by means of military support, but also in the form of economic and financial assistance which could reinforce the underlying structures and foundations of state capacity for maintaining self-defence. Multiple forms of aid and assistance from the European Union and its Member States have been offered and delivered in response to the entirely unjustified and illegal Russian war against Ukraine. These have drawn on both national and EU budgetary resources. According

to its official account, the Union and its members together have provided or committed over EUR 93 billion in support of Ukraine and its people: EUR 81 billion in financial, budget support and humanitarian assistance and EUR 12.2 billion of grants, loans and guarantees by the EU Member States as bilateral aid (Council of the European Union, 2025a). In the form of Macro-financial Assistance, the EU dedicated altogether 16.5 billion Euros to predictable and sizeable financial support for Ukraine last year to cover its immediate funding needs in 2023. This form of economic aid from the European Union was approved and channelled to Ukraine in order to enable the struggling country to maintain essential state functions (public services), ensure a necessary minimal macroeconomic stability and restore critical infrastructure (such as energy infrastructure, water systems, transport networks, roads and bridges) destroyed by the Russia military (Council of the European Union, 2025a).

Further sustainable and predictable EU financial assistance is understood to prove essential for keeping Ukraine solvent in the coming years even under the growing strains of the increasingly ruthless and destructive war without end in sight. With a view to the enormously damaging consequences of the Russian war of aggression, EU members could eventually agree in February 2024 that significant and flexible aid to Ukraine was necessary “to maintain its functions, provide public services, as well as to support the recovery, reconstruction and modernisation of the country”. For this purpose, the so-called Ukraine Facility was established as “an exceptional medium-term single instrument” for the period 2024 to 2027 to assure certainty in the provision of requisite funds underwriting the financial needs of vital state functions as fundamental conditions for the sustained conduct of Ukrainian self-defence (Regulation (EU) 2024/792). The Ukraine Facility was conceived to help

closing the funding gap of Ukraine until 2027 by providing non-repayable support and highly concessional loans in a predictable, continuous, orderly and timely manner (Regulation (EU) 2024/792, Recital 16).

The overall maximum amount for all types of possible EU support under the Ukraine Facility was set at the level of EUR 50 billion (Regulation (EU) 2024/792, Recital 48). As a crucial source of foreign

material assistance to the continued operation and reconstruction of the Ukrainian state and economy, the adoption and designation of an EU financial instrument confirmed the availability of a stable stream of funds (grants and loans) as indispensable life-support for a country defending its own survival.

Even if the financial means transferred to and spent on Ukraine since the beginning of the Russian onslaught have not been formally identified as assistance directly related to the conduct of Ukrainian self-defence, this kind of collective and concerted economic support has already conveyed vital contributions to maintaining essential state functions and continue to significantly enhance the resilience and the capacity of the Ukrainian state for sustained self-defence. The broader intended aim of economic support for Ukrainian with regard to its recovery from the devastating effects of the war could possible also help in the development and extension of an industrial base and infrastructure necessary for a more self-reliant production of the means of self-defence (Greene, Ribakova, & Rzegock, 2024).

2. COORDINATED EUROPEAN AND NON- -EUROPEAN MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO UKRAINE

As part of its ongoing and evolving cooperation with Ukraine, NATO launched the Comprehensive Assistance Package (CAP) for Ukraine programme which was further strengthened after the large-scale Russian invasion in 2022. Importantly, it only includes non-lethal military assistance and longer-term capacity-building projects to assist Ukraine with its defence and security sector reforms (Comprehensive Assistance Package, 2024).

With respect to immediate and short-term lethal military assistance from foreign states to Ukraine, national initiatives and offers of contributions to its desperate struggle for self-preservation were turned into concerted efforts through the Ukraine Defence Contact Group (UDCG) initiated by the United States and first convened in April 2022 at the airbase in Ramstein (thereafter the coordinating coalition was named the “Ramstein format” of states) as a multilateral platform for the coordination of individual offers of military assets or train and equip help from willing and able countries (Bazhenova,

2023). It has performed a crucial function in the alignment of national donations from reportedly about 50 countries (Ukraine Defense Contact Group, 2024) to expedite and increase the efficiency of individual state assistance to the continued resistance of Ukraine. Although concerted, these measures of support are not conceived, determined and conducted as “collective acts” of a specific group of states, but rather as a set of complementary and, ideally, reinforcing national pledges and implementing acts.

Many participants in this ad hoc coalition of willing states are EU countries whose offers and delivery of material support or training assistance have been facilitated by their orchestration and combination within the framework of a collective EU mission or through a collective financial burden-sharing scheme. Although the forms and means of military assistance to Ukraine organized or reimbursed through the European Union do not represent some different or specific kind of aid, but the national offers and acts of contributions are connected, coordinated and implemented on the basis of collective EU decisions and financed by collectively generated EU funds.

Until now, the EU and its Member States altogether have reportedly mobilised €47.3 billion in military support for Ukraine. This level of defence assistance includes the delivery of military equipment and supplies covered by a specific EU budgetary instrument, the European Peace Facility (EPF) up to €6.1 billion. In combination with the transfer of material help for self-defence, military training assistance has been also organized and funded (with €362 million) as collective EU action for the Ukrainian Armed Forces, which has already involved more than 65 000 Ukrainian soldiers (Council of the European Union, 2025b).

3. THE EU FINANCIAL INSTRUMENT FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE: EUROPEAN PEACE FACILITY

The European Peace Facility has emerged as the most important vehicle for channelling collectively assembled EU financial resources into defence deliveries and support for military training activities. This particular financial instrument of EU Common Foreign and Security Policy was set in the spring of 2021 with the aim to

- cover military or defence expenses related to military operations/missions under the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) of the EU, and
- ensure possible funds for its external (state or international organizational) partners in the maintenance of international peace and security (Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/509).

The EPF was installed as a new stand-alone financial reserve to be mobilized for its defining aims independently of the implementation of other aspects of EU external action financed from different chapters or programmes of its sizable central budget. As a purpose-built instrument of support, the European Peace Facility was originally endowed with a pool of EUR 5.69 billion for the period 2021-2027 which was later increased several times and it has reached EUR 17 billion by 2024 (The European Peace Facility Factsheet, 2024).

In both of its designed functions, the European Peace Facility served as the financial vehicle for underpinning – partly or entirely – the combination of contributions from Member States to initiatives in support of enhancing and improving the capacity of Ukraine to conduct its self-defence. As a directly and readily available instrument for the provision of financial means of collective military assistance coordinated through its institutions, the European Union mobilized and increased its financial resources available under the EPF to cover large parts of the costs related to the transfer of military hardware from its Member States to Ukraine and also those necessary for the sharing the military “software” (training and expertise) with the embattled country.

4. EU FINANCED MILITARY SUPPORT FROM MEMBER STATES TO THE UKRAINIAN ARMED FORCES

In response to the open and large-scale Russian aggression, the European Union began to mobilize the European Peace Facility to provide common funding for military assistance of all possible types. Within few days, the Council passed its first decisions about assistance measures to Ukraine of both lethal (Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/338) and non-lethal (Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/339) character. These

initial responses were followed within a 1 year by similar steps in seven rounds of assistance measures in the order of magnitude of €500 million each. The agreed assistance measures under the EPF ensure funds to cover the costs of weapon systems, ammunition and missiles and – in the non-lethal category – of various personal, protective and communication equipment, first aid kits and fuel.

4.1. Repeated adjustments for increased delivery of support

On 20 March 2023, the Council arrived at an agreement on a three-track approach in order to enhance the means and accelerate the delivery of assistance – aiming at one million rounds altogether – from existing national stocks and joint procurement of artillery ammunition and possibly missiles for Ukraine in joint efforts within 12 months. In the first track, EU members agreed in April 2023 to increase significantly the resources of military assistance and added 1 billion Euros to the EPF funds designated to support for the Ukrainian Armed Forces. It was intended to allow the EU to reimburse Member States for ammunition donated to Ukraine from their existing stocks or by giving priority to Ukraine over existing orders during the period 9 February to 31 May 2023 (Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/810). Simultaneously with the approval of the extra funds intended for military assistance to Ukraine, the Council requested Member States to deliver without delay ground-to-ground and artillery ammunition to Ukraine and, if requested, missiles (Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/810).

In addition to the expected mobilization of already available reserve ammunitions in Member States, another assistance measure was adopted on 5 May 2023 to make another €1 billion available for joint procurement by EU countries of ammunition and missiles from economic operators established in the EU or Norway. It was meant to act as catalyst among Member States to combine their demands and improve the conditions of their common acquisition of very much needed artillery rounds for Ukraine from the European defence industry in the fastest way possible (Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/927).

4.2. A dedicated addition to the EPF: Ukraine Assistance Fund

Even if the costs of military aid to Ukrainian self-defence have figured most prominently on the list of assistance measures with reference to the European Peace Facility, the European Union has also dispensed resources from the same pool in support of a number of other states since the Russian invasion. Assured availability of sufficient resources for the continued assistance to Ukraine appeared to require the designation of a certain amount to that purpose under the EPF.

At their European Council (EUCO) summit in December 2023, EU heads of state and government confirmed the importance of “timely, predictable and sustainable military support for Ukraine” through the EPF and EUMAM Ukraine in addition to direct bilateral assistance by Member States. Consequently, the EUCO called for the reform of EPF and the expansion of the available financial resources through the introduction of a Ukraine Assistance Fund as new component of the EPF (European Council, 2024a).

With the aim of further extension of options for future assistance, the Ukraine Assistance Fund (UAF) as a “dedicated envelope” within the EPF was duly proposed by the EU High Representative to ensure sustainable and predictable military support to Ukraine. The new Fund was conceived to constitute a core element of long-term EU security commitments to Ukraine and allow continued financial solidarity among Member States. In response to the evolving needs of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, the Assistance Fund was initiated to shift the practice of reimbursement from Member State deliveries from stocks and unilateral procurement to the provision of (lethal and non-lethal) support based on joint procurement through European industry (Proposal from the High Representative, 2024).

The resulting Council decision adopted in March 2024 increased the EPF financial ceiling by an amount of EUR 5 billion expressly dedicated to military support for Ukraine (Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/890). Collective defence aid financed from the Ukraine Assistance Fund is expected to take place through “a more structured, efficient and pragmatic approach” by means of increased joint procurement from the European defence industry (and Norway) (Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/890, Recital 8). Military support under the dedicated amount also

includes the assured continuation of the “train and equip” form of assistance provided through EUMAM Ukraine in line with the evolving training needs of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The proposal for the UAF envisaged possible “further comparable increases” until 2027 based on Ukrainian needs and contingent upon political guidance from the EUCO (Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/890, Recital 11).

In June 2024, the Council eventually mobilized the first slice of funds drawn from the proceeds of Russian state assets frozen within EU jurisdiction. The much needed further assistance amounted to €1.4 billion in military aid for Ukraine. Most of it was assigned for direct purchases of ammunition and aerial defence systems with the remaining quarter of the sum used for purchases from Ukrainian industries (Barigazzi, 2024). The introduction of the UAF proved its utility as the vehicle for directing extraordinary revenues generated by those frozen sovereign Russian instruments into resources to finance an expedited solution – direct procurement of military equipment and ammunition – to respond to immediate Ukrainian needs without the standard two-staged – first, transfer of available supplies from Member States, then financial reimbursement of most its value to the country – EPF procedure (Council conclusions on EU security and defence, 2024).

5. EU MILITARY ASSISTANCE BY CAPACITY-BUILDING: TRAINING MISSION FOR UKRAINE, BUT IMPLEMENTED WITHIN THE UNION

As a particular form of military assistance intended to enhance the skills and preparedness of Ukrainian military personnel, the EU members chose to open another avenue for their collective action bolstering the fighting know-how of Ukraine. In the last 20 years – since the beginning of CSDP operations and missions in 2003 – of EU crisis management undertakings in Europe and beyond, no operational measures have been taken by the EU in response to any situation similar to such an ostentatious and grave crisis in the immediate neighbourhood as the naked Russian aggression against Ukraine. EU security operations and missions were envisaged as engagements “outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and

strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter” (Article 42(1), TEU). Until Russia unleashed its full-scale invasion in Ukraine, all CSDP deployments by military or civilian means beyond the external borders of the Union had been conducted as EU crisis management initiatives in coordination with and normally complementary to other multilateral (UN or African Union-led) peace support, stabilization and capacity-building endeavours in various conflict zones on the European security perimeter or in Africa.

The unprecedented security contingency on the European continent ignited on 24 February 2022 triggered an extension of CSDP practice to include a military mission conceived as an instrument of collective EU enabling assistance to the exercise of self-defence adjacent to eastern borders of the European Union. As always, the adoption of any form of implementation of EU security and defence policy with “military or defence implications” depended upon the achievement of full consensus among Member States (Article 31(4), TEU). The nature of the armed conflict and the potential attendant risks of any direct EU support to the Ukrainian military within the theatre of the aggression made the customary requirement of unanimity among Member States even more vital to reach on the agreeable and practicable collective form of defence assistance on behalf of the European Union.

In direct response to the express request from Ukraine in September 2022 for support to capacity-building, the EU members embraced a proposal to help Ukrainian Armed Forces with various types of training as well as coordinate and synchronize their respective national activities initiated to that effect. Accordingly, the Council of the European Union established its Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine (EUMAM Ukraine) with the aim of strengthening the capacity of the Ukrainian Armed Forces to defend the territorial integrity of the country within its internationally recognised borders, effectively exercise its sovereignty and protect the civilians in Ukraine (Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/1968).

In line with its defined general purpose, the EU military mission for Ukraine was launched with the objective to offer concrete support in the form of basic and collective military training, as well as specialised military training of personnel in medicine, logistics, chemical,

biological and radiation (CBRN) protection, engineering support, cyber security and cyber defence, and combined arms instructors training (Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/1968, Recital 4). Most EU Member States – altogether 24 of them – offered training modules and personnel.

Initially, the range of EU-coordinated training activities were designed as individual, collective and specialised training for the Ukrainian army and the Territorial Defence Forces, later their personal scope was expanded to include other units (from the National Guard, the State Border Service, the National Police and the Security Service of Ukraine) under the operational control of the UAF. The scale of EU military capacity-building assistance was upgraded as additional funding was dedicated to the operational improvement of Ukrainian Armed Forces in the face of the relentless Russian onslaught half way through the original 2 years term of the mission (Council of the EU Press release 943/23, 2023).

In the assessment of the Council, EUMAM could accomplish the training of 60 000 Ukrainian soldiers by the end of summer in 2024. Beyond increased quantity, the driving purpose of the EU mission was confirmed as real-time response to the evolving and urgent needs of the Ukrainian armed forces in concerts with other countries engaged in similar assistance to Ukraine. In order to ensure more effective EU contribution to operational effect, besides the sustained focus on its quality, the extension of the scope of training to “the maritime and air domains” was recently endorsed by EU Member States (Council conclusions on EU security and defence, 2024). In pursuit of better support to the training needs of the Ukrainian military, the corresponding enhancement of the EUMAM capacity was also approved at strategic level by the EU heads of states and governments at their summit in June 2024 (European Council, 2024b).

5.1. Unusual spatial dimension: implementation within the Union as precautionary measure

In order to avoid any possible direct – active (for instance, in self-defence) or passive (becoming targets of Russian attacks) – engagement in the hostilities on Ukrainian territory, all training activities

on land, in the air or at sea orchestrated under EU guidance were determined to take place within the territories of EU Member States (Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/1968). A multinational Combined Arms Training Command (CAT-C) was established in Poland, meanwhile a Special Training Command (STC) was formed to oversee other training activities from Germany (EUMAM Factsheet, 2022).

5.2. The budgetary collective dimension: financial burden-sharing

So far the overall EU budgetary resources assigned to the implementation of EUMAM Ukraine amounted to 362 million Euros. The dedicated budget was approved to cover those costs which Member States agreed to share and bear jointly when decided to mobilize and align their national training capabilities and expertise under an EU coordinative umbrella. The combined expenses to be financed collectively were envisaged under the “common costs of operation” (altogether EUR 107 million): accumulated either in the form of support for the participation of UAF personnel and the costs necessary for the training activities (Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/1968). In order to facilitate continued large-scale training, additional funding (further EUR 194 million) for EUMAM was approved by EU Member States after the 1st year to ensure – also through the European Peace Facility – the financial requisites for the provision of necessary lethal and non-lethal equipment and supplies together with services to back the training activities (Council of the European Union Press Release 943/23, 2023). As the result of military activities under EUMAM, 70 000 soldiers have been trained since the launch of the mission in November 2022 (EUMAM Factsheet, 2025).

5.3. Contribution from and coordination with partners from outside the Union

Similar to other EU security and defence undertakings, the EUMAM Ukraine was declared open to the participation of countries (third states) outside the Union. Most CSDP crisis management operations

and missions are conducted with the external state partners joining the group of EU countries as participants in the acting multinational coalitions. As a prime example of third party participation in military assistance under EU organizational framework, Norway was the first external state partner of the EU to join its training initiative as another way of military assistance to Ukraine (Norway, EEAS 2023). Beyond direct the dispatch of its military trainers, Norway complemented its contribution to the implementation of EUMAM Ukraine by financial help (approximately EUR 14 million) to the budgetary foundations of the EU mission (EU military support for Ukraine, 2025).

In order to enhance the efficiency of activities under EU direction, EUMAM also seeks to closely coordinate with other like-minded international partners willing and able to offer their training support to the Ukrainian Armed Forces. For the sake of more efficient simultaneous efforts to share valuable military know-how and practice with the Ukrainian military, some European non-EU NATO members (such as the United Kingdom) and Canada have proved to be the most important partners for the EU in that respect. Sustained coordination of EU collective assistance with those partners permits the alignment of European contributions with an even wider frame of concerted military support to Ukrainian defence capabilities. Through collaboration with the British military partners, EUMAM training activities can be synchronized with other countries such Australia and New Zealand as part of the UK-led and based multinational training mission to bolster UAF fighting skills and technical knowledge (Australian Government, 2023).

6. IN CONCLUSION: THE RELEVANCE OF THE DISTINCT EU SOLUTION FOR COLLECTIVE MILITARY ASSISTANCE

In almost 3 years, EU Member States individually and also in coordination with one another and also with many other countries outside the Union have extended various forms of help and granted military, economic, technical as well as humanitarian assistance to Ukraine in its struggle against a brutal invader. For the sake of greater efficiency, military assistance offered at national level can be aligned

and orchestrated with like-minded partners within a larger group of states or through smaller cluster of countries – as so-called “capability coalitions” – reinforcing and complementing their own contributions to concerted multinational efforts. Coordination can be maintained in ad hoc coalition as the “Ramstein Format” has demonstrated.

Conventionally, neither lethal nor non-lethal foreign defence assistance was perceived and accepted as an issue falling within EU competence or within the scope of application of any EU financial instrument. That practice changed as a novel avenue for military aid from the European Union was opened by the introduction of a specific tool of EU foreign and security policy under the name of European Peace Facility (EPF) in 2021. The EPF has proven to be the appropriate vehicle for the “mutualisation” of financial costs and political direction of the “collectivized” assistance from EU Member States in the form of transfer of military hardware and “software” (skills and knowledge) to Ukraine for the exercise of its self-defence.

All consensual decisions on EU defence support for Ukrainian armed resistance to the Russian aggression – either as the delivery of lethal and non-lethal military equipment or as military training – have been taken as interrelated by their overall purpose and, in some degree, mutually complementary. Both forms of enabling EU military aid rely on one particular and suitable instrument, the European Peace Facility as the financially sustaining pillar and defining feature of collective assistance of 27 countries through the European Union. The avenue for defence aid as a novel instrument of EU Common Foreign and Security Policy was opened by the introduction of European Peace Facility in 2021 designed for the purpose of targeted military assistance. The EPF has served as the appropriate vehicle for the “mutualisation” of financial costs and the political direction turning disparate transfer of military hardware and “software” (skills and knowledge) from EU Member States into collectively funded assistance for Ukraine enabling its exercise of self-defence.

The standing institutional framework and operational practice of the European Union provided a natural platform for close coordination together with the predictable benefits of the mobilization and employment of an available EU instrument for burden-sharing. Recourse to EU procedures, platforms and funds for concerted measures and common action in response to an unprecedented and grave security

crisis in Europe assured that the intended effects of disparate and simultaneous national acts of support and aid to Ukrainian struggle for survival could be facilitated and enhanced through the use of collective EU material resources and enabling activities under EU banner.

The collective character of military support was determined by the decision of Member States to rely on the European Peace Facility as the suitable and available financial instrument for burden-sharing through the “collectivization” of the political supervision and the attendant costs of diverse contributions to material (equipment and ammunition) and training assistance. Due to the lack of any similar instrument and the absence of political inclination to explore the same course of action, no other European or larger international organizational framework could be applied to serve as an institutional platform for the same kind of collective assistance in the conduct of self-defence by the Ukrainian state.


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