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Demystifying Deconstruction – Deconstruction as a Tool for Analysis of IR Theory

Summary

The aim of this article is to present deconstruction as an important tool for analysis of international relations theory. The usage of deconstruction by representatives of postmodern approaches is introduced. The author argues that, despite the fact that deconstruction is presented by mainstream international relations scholars as a flawed method that is improper from the viewpoint of the discipline's development, deconstruction properly explicated and operationalised could be a successful strategy for critique and interpretation of international relations theory. The next step taken by the author is an analysis of the term itself and the textual phenomena that stem from it, which enables him to present a deconstructionist framework useful for theory interpretation and critique. The article concludes by arguing that the use of deconstruction does not necessarily mean that its results will be much different than the mainstream critiques.

Keyworlds
    Deconstruction, International Relations,
    Theory – Critique and Interpretation

DEMISTYFIKUJĄC DEKONSTRUKCJĘ – DEKONSTRUKCJA JAKO NARZĘDZIE ANALIZY TEORII STOSUNKÓW MIĘDZYNARODOWYCH

Streszczenie

Celem niniejszego artykułu jest wskazanie na dekonstrukcję jako istotne narzędzie analizy teorii stosunków międzynarodowych. Przedstawione jest użycie tego narzędzia przez przedstawicieli tzw. podejść postmodernistycznych. Autor stawia tezę, że choć dekonstrukcja jest traktowana przez przedstawicieli głównego nurtu stosunków międzynarodowych jako metoda nieskuteczna i niewłaściwa ze względu na rozwój dyscypliny, to właściwie pojmowana może służyć jako skuteczne narzędzie krytyki i interpretacji teorii stosunków międzynarodowych. Kolejnym krokiem jest analiza pojęcia dekonstrukcji i składających się na nią terminów oraz wskazanie, w jaki sposób mogą one zostać wykorzystane w analizie i krytyce tekstów z zakresu stosunków międzynarodowych. Konkluzją artykułu jest stwierdzenie, że użycie dekonstrukcji wcale nie musi przynosić skutków różnych od krytyki przedstawicieli tzw. głównego nurtu.

Słowa kluczowe
dekonstrukcja, stosunki międzynarodowe, teoria – analiza i interpretacja

DEMYSTIFYINGDECONSTRUCTION–DECONSTRUCTION AS A TOOL FOR ANALYSIS OF IR THEORY

> Limited respect, which is prepared, calculated is no respect at all, but a tactic, cunningness of behaviour, cleverness, politics in the worst meaning of the term. Thus, one should have absolute respect for what is happening, which is always individual, for only absolute, uncalculated respect is able to honour the individuality of someone or something [Markowski 2004].

Postmodernism, and deconstruction, as its main vessel in IR theory is considered a threat to the discipline by positivistic approaches, such as neorealism or neoliberal institutionalism. It serves as a word indicating "something nefarious that destroys a lifetime work of mainstream IR scholars." Something that brings uncertainty and chaos to the theories, anarchy to their meaning and relativity to values

underpinning them (the other thing is that mainstream IR scholars probably would deny the existence of any values in their theories). It is indeed a *"bête noir* of the discipline,"* to use words from Richard Devetak's much quoted essay [Devetak 2006, p. 235]. But after reading postmodernists in IR, or postmodernists interpreting postmodernist, writing in the field, this somewhat allergic reaction from academics in the main branch of IR theory becomes much more understandable.

Derrida, the famous, and controversial French philosopher, and author of the term deconstruction, began his work first by a close reading of the classical philosophical literary and social sciences texts of his time, and developed his conceptions on this basis. On reading postmodernist literature in IR one gets the impression that something is missing from their double reading of theoretical formulation of international issues such as, anarchy, sovereignty or power and of theories in which they are employed. The thing that is missing is the first reading in which the would-be deconstructor should construct the meaning of the text with amity.[1]

This essay is partially a response to this situation. I will try to show how an analytical framework inspired by Derrida's deconstruction could be applied to IR theories. By doing so I hope to demystify deconstruction and show how it can help to understand the construction of the most important texts in contemporary IR.

The simple use of deconstruction as a critical tool somehow strays from the point of this textual practice. The whole interpretational institution is grounded in a continental philosophical tradition, and the apprehension of the context in which deconstruction matured in the early works by Derrida, is essential to understand the term and its employment.[2] Yet, the whole endeavour of defining it, according to Derrida, misses the point. As interpretations show, in violation of Derrida's claims that deconstruction is indefinable, the definitions are somewhat vague [Crithley, Mooney 1994, pp. 365-366]. Thus

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1   For general introduction to postmodernism in IR cf. [Pickard 2014; Devetak 2006]. For exemplary works of postmodernists in IR cf. [Ashley 1988, pp. 227-262; Constantinou 1994, pp. 1-24].

2   For introduction to Derrida cf. [Johnson 1998]; for a general discussion on Derrida's deconstruction and its philosophical context cf. [Silverman 1989; Stocker 2006]; for interesting essays introducing Deridian ideas through analytic philosophy perspective cf. [Wheeler III 2000].

any reference to Derrida in IR, and the usage of "deconstruction," is clearly such a referral, and should be made with extreme caution – a simple statement that someone is deconstructing some international phenomena, or theory means only that this person wants to criticize it, and deconstruction is a fashionable word to label this critique. This is not to say that those critics are incorrect, but to state that a deeper philosophical understanding of Derrida's work is essential, and for any serious postmodern critique of mainstream IR theory.

First I will present the meaning of deconstruction itself and try to reconstruct its meaning; second, I will pose a question about the content of deconstruction as a critical textual practice; third, I will try to make those concepts useful for the practice of theoretical critique in IR theory.

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Before one could even approach the answer to the question "what is deconstruction?" a few remarks about the general idea behind Derrida's work are needed. In order to understand his thought it is important to apprehend the role that time played in it. Derrida's critique of metaphysics was concerned with a concept present in western philosophy since its very beginnings. This concept is the perception of being as something that is unchangeable. This has very profound consequences for understanding itself – the sense, meaning of a word, idea or utterance, which is necessary for understanding, has to be present as something unchangeable. This idea lies behind *logocentrism*[3] – an approach to language that gives priority to speech over the written text, and of which Derrida was a fierce opponent. His own approach was *textualism* which considered the whole social reality, and language as its main component, as a text, that is an ever-changing constellation of ever-changing meanings interrelated with each other. The dimension of this change is time. Such a situation calls for constant interpretation and interpretation of interpretation (and so on), in the way written texts do. It is is within the thus perceived text that deconstruction can take place. In Derrida's own words:

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3   Cf. "logocentricity" in: [Sim 2001, p. 306] and "logocentrism" in: [Honderich 1995, p. 511].

> Deconstruction cannot limit itself or proceed immediately to neutralization: it must by means of double gesture, a double science, a double writing, practice and *overturning* of the classical opposition *and* general *displacement* of the system. It is only to the condition that deconstruction will provide itself the means with which to intervene in the field of oppositions that it criticizes, which is also a field of nondiscursive forces. Each concept, moreover, belongs to a systematic change and itself constitutes a system of predicates. There is no metaphysical concept in and for itself. There is a work – metaphysical or not – on conceptual systems. Deconstruction does not consist in passing from one concept to another, but overturning and displacing a conceptual order, as well as the nonconceptual order with which the conceptual order is articulated [Derrida 1982, p. 329].

As the above fragment depicts Derrida's writing is not an easy one. Thus one interpretation of his texts is not a task to be taken lightly. But what is the meaning of deconstruction for postmodernists in IR and outside this discipline? The above mentioned Richard Devetak focuses on the "double reading" as an essence of deconstruction considered as method of interpretation. This practice consists of two readings of a particular text – one in which its logic is constructed and constituted, and the second which aims at displaying internal tensions in the analyzed text. He argues, that the task of "double reading" as a way to deconstruct is the understanding both of the complexity of a discourse or social institution and how they are always in danger of destabilization [Devetak 2006, pp. 242-243]. Yet, after reading his remarks on deconstruction one is left with the impression that it is a tool of analysis; a mere methodology with which one can criticize theories and social institutions. This approach, of course, has its merits, for Devetak's text in consideration comes from a textbook on IR theory, and as such should be understandable for undergraduate students, and enable them to use it in their studies of international reality. Yet oversimplification of the deconstruction obviously follows from this approach. Although it is easy to accuse postmodernists in IR of oversimplification following from the lack of their formal philosophical training, on the other hand, definitions made by professional philosophers may be hard to understand for someone without their training.

Taking into consideration their simplicity, an interesting attempt to define deconstruction is made by an analytic philosopher Samuel C. Wheeler:

> The original pattern of what would come to be "called deconstruction" is the following. The text that argues for thesis *t* uses essentially a premise *p* that presupposes that not-*t*. The thesis of the text is undermined by presuppositions of some of the premises used to support it. "Presuppose" in the original form of deconstructive argument is defined truth-conditionally. If *p* presupposes not-*t*, than if *p* is true, *t* must be false. Deconstruction directly attacks not a thesis but only argument for a thesis [Wheeler 2000, p. 37].

Although presented in a type of language alien to Derrida, this account of deconstruction remains simple and understandable, yet does not reify the concept. The only problem that may be posed is truth-conditions. In the light of the above definition, they should be understood as conditions from outside of the text being deconstructed, which on the one hand gives it an appearance of stability through connecting its inner-logic with some metaphysical element; yet on the other, the sheer movement of transcendence, going outside of the system (the text), is the reason why the text is deconstructed (by itself).

One of the most contentious definitions of deconstruction may be found on the final pages of Barry Stocker's *Companion on Derrida and Deconstruction*. He presents deconstruction as a three step process. The first step is to reduce the meaning of the text according to the strictest metaphysical structuralism. This should lead to countering anthropological or humanist metaphysics and show the bareness of its meaning. The second step is in fact a "strategic bet" – a phrase Stocker uses to emphasize Derrida's approach, favouring chance over necessity. This bet should make the text tremble, which in turn is a duality, a double reading, that trembles the text from within making its assumptions transparent by repeating them, and from outside by absolute opposition. Both aspects of the bet have a necessary risk: tremble from within may lead to staying within the system, tremble from outside may result in naivety – the repetition of text assumptions in a complete attack on it. The last step is a discussion between two dimensions of deconstruction, which are connected with two approaches from step two. In Stocker's view, the solution is to refer to Nietzsche's notion of plurality present in styles and languages.[4]

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4   This definition is worth quoting at length, for it is a very close interpretation of Derrida's work, it gives a reader a glimpse into the author's universe. "The

The last step of this definition is somewhat vague. The best way to show the difference between the two dimensions is to quote from Derrida himself:

> Turned towards the lost or impossible presence of the absent origin, this structuralist thematic of broken immediacy is therefore the saddened, *negative*, nostalgic, guilty, Rousseauistic side of thinking of play whose other side would be the Nietzschean *affirmation*, that is the joyous affirmation of world of signs without fault, without truth, and without origin which is offered to an active interpretation [Derrida 1978, p. 292].

Yet all of this does not mean that Derrida is persuaded that one pole of deconstruction is right, and the other is wrong, although he is more sympathetic to the affirmative pole, he is also aware that only the presence of both can make deconstruction progress [Stocker 2006, p. 187].

To recapitulate, deconstruction may be perceived as a way in which one gets into relation with the text, and is a consequence of this relation. This duality may also be expressed by the following statement:

> first step is a reduction of meaning, which means the reduction to system or structure according to the most pure Structuralism in the metaphysical tradition, which counters anthropological, or humanist metaphysics, and all notions of meaning. The second step is a strategic bet from, a phrase Derrida is using to emphasize the supremacy of chance over necessity, which trembles the system in a violent relationship of Western thought with what is other to it. The trembling is divided in into two strategies: exiting the system by making its basic assumptions completely explicit in repeating them, which risks staying within the system; exiting the system by going right outside of it and opposing it completely, which risks repeating the system in a blindness, or naïveté, which ignores the likelihood of repeating the assumptions of a system in a complete attack on it. The third stem is a discussion of the difference between the superior man and super human. That distinction, which is also the distinction between Rousseau/Husserl/Heidegger and Nietzsche, is clearly to be identified with the distinction between a trembling of the system from within, and the trembling of the system from outside. The suggested resolution of these two strategies is a solution according to Nietzsche, referring to Nietzsche's use of plurality of styles and languages" [Stocker 2006, p.188].

> Deconstruction is not a theory Derrida applies, but a movement within philosophy and within the consciousness that phenomenological philosophy is trying to describe. There is a sense here of Deconstruction as a material force, though Deconstruction does appear in other texts by Derrida as the conscious strategy of a philosopher [Stocker 2006, p. 177].

Whether it is a manifestation of language specifics itself, or a consequence of a conscious approach on the part of the deconstructing reader, "two readings" are an essential feature of deconstruction.

The "first reading" is a repetition of the deconstructed text. Yet, it is important to stress that even the most careful repetition is always a commentary, an interpretation of a given text. Thus Derrida explains:

> the moment of what I called, perhaps clumsily, "doubling commentary" does not suppose the self identity of "meaning," but the relative stability of dominant interpretation (including auto-interpretation) of the text being commented upon [Derrida 1988, p. 143].

Therefore the aim of commentary is to show the reproducibility and stability of conventional interpretation of a given text. This commentary, a repetition of the dominant interpretation should show what the text means to the most of its readers, and by doing so, depict a minimal consensus about how it should be understood. This is the duty of a scholar to demonstrate his competence in understanding his field of study and the text being deconstructed:

> If deconstructive reading is to possess any demonstrative necessity, it is initially in virtue of how faithfully it reconstructs the dominant interpretation of a text in a layer of "commentary" [Derrida 1988, p. 367].

If the "first reading" is a commentary amiable to the text, what is the "second reading" then? In Derrida's own words:

> We wanted to attain the point of certain exteriority with respect to the totality of the logocentric epoch. From this point of exteriority a certain deconstruction of this totality… could be broached [*enetamée*] [Derrida 1975, pp. 161-162].

Thus the "second reading" should destabilize the dominant inter-pretation of the text; it should acquire the quality of being outside of the text, and yet still have strong relation to its inner logic. It must locate itself between the repetition, and interpretation on the basis of the other text present in a given tradition from which the text origi-nates. This means that text should be opposed by itself – its meaning intended by the author is confronted with what may be perceived as the linguistic consequences of it. Therefore:

> Derrida often articulates this double reading around a semantic am-bivalence in the usage of a particular word, like *supplement* in Rous-seau, *pharmakon* in Plato or *Geist* in Heidegger. It is of absolutely crucial importance that this second moment, that of alterity, should be shown to arise necessarily form the first moment of repetitive commentary [Crithley, Mooney 1994, p. 369].

To understand how this moment of alterity is possible, the intro-duction of three terms, iteration, différeance, and trace is necessary. Although all those terms, coined by Derrida, are complex and vague, I would argue that understanding them is a key to understanding deconstruction as a textual activity, and to propose how they could be used to criticize international relations texts.

The term *iteration* is introduced by Derrida when he engages in the deconstruction of Edmund Husserl's Phenomenology.[5] Iterability means that something is repeated, but with repetition comes some-thing different, something new in respect to a pervious state from before repetition. In Derrida's view iterability in phenomenology leads the latter to a paradox, in which phenomenology leaves out

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5   Phenomenology is a movement within continental philosophy. Its founder was Edmund Husserl. Phenomenology rests on sharp distinction between percep-tion of properties of a given object and abstract properties. If we see the colour of particular object, and then some other object of the other shade of the same color our perceptions of both are instances of some abstract, universal colour. Phenomenology claims that beside our perceptions of the shades of a particu-lar colour we have a perception of a universal color that is the final instance of our perception. This final instance is given to us by "eidetic intuition"; that is, our perception of the universal is what phenomenology calls the essence of a particular object. Initially phenomenology was a theory of knowledge, but then after 1913, it was transformed into a form of philosophical idealism. Cf. "phenomenology" in: [Honderich 1995, pp. 658-660].

the empirical idea of a particular object which is brought to infinite repetition, which leads to its transformation into infinite idea; that is, an essence of a given object.[6] Yet, iteration is not only part of a complicated philosophical argument in Derrida's deconstruction of Husserl, it can be also presented in a more positive way, as something that may be perceived as one of the qualities of language:

> The possibility of repeating, and therefore identifying, marks is implied in every code, making of it a communicable, transmittable, decipherable grid that is iterable… for any possible user [Derrida 1982, p. 315].

In the above fragment of Derrida's writing there is a notion that:

> Some iterable aspect of the semantic item is what carries the meaning. Whatever is semantic is so via and in virtue of what is taken as iterable in it [Derrida 1982, p. 315].

It is, then, clear that for Derrida iterability takes away the meaning of a word, idea, or utterance, which are all parts of language. If it is possible to repeat an utterance and give it other meaning than this from before repetition, and than repeat this practice *ad infinitum*, that meaning is impossible. To construct meaning then something from outside the iterable utterance must be given; this thing from outside is a context, yet the context itself can be an object of iterability. This leads to an endless line of interpretation and repetition of interpretation, and interpretation of repetition. This can be put to an end only by introduction of a metaphysical assumption that fixes the meaning at the beginning of the chain of iterable repetition and interpretation. Yet, for Derrida, such a metaphysical assumption was a magic language which stayed, in contrast with his aim of getting out of, metaphysics [Derrida 1982, p. 24].

Time, as was mentioned earlier, was an important part of Derrida's thinking about language, or to be more precise, a text. The temporal dimension in which Derrida introduces his notion of a text is important for is stresses the way in which the text unconditionally

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6   For the explanation of this paradox present in phenomenology and Derrida's position in this respect cf. [Stocker 2006, p. 108].

differentiates meanings which in turn constitute the complex systems of language. In contrast with the popular notion of the text as something viewable and concrete, Derrida views the text as a process, a movement that is creating differences, which in turn can, and are "stored" in the structure of the language system, for later use and presentation [Johnson 1998, p. 57]. Différeance is a neologism formed by Derrida to describe this process of deferral and differentiation.[7] The term can be apprehended as the extension of the theory of language present in the thought of Ferdinand de Saussure, who perceived language as a system of differences.

Différeance can be also viewed in the light of the ontological distinction made by Martin Heidegger between Being[8] and being considered as such:

> It is the domination of beings that *différeance* everywhere comes to solicit, in the sense that *sollicitare*, in old Latin, means to shake as whole, to make tremble in entirety. Therefore, it is the determination of Being as presence or as beingness that is interrogated by the thought of *différeance*. Such a question could not emerge and be understood unless the difference between Being and beings were somewhere to be broached. First consequence: *différeance* is not. It is not a present being, however excellent, unique, principal, or transcendent. It is not announced by any capital letter. (…) Since being has never had a "meaning", has never been thought or said as such, except by dissimulation itself in beings, than *différeance*, in a certain and very strange way, (is) "older" than the ontological difference or than the truth of Being [Derrida 1982, pp. 21-22].

In the light of the above fragment from Derrida, Being should not be considered as a detached meaning. It is constituted by beings and in turn constitutes them. It is a type of relation similar to the relation between the mind as a subject of knowing and senses as their source, or culture and nature. Thus *différeance* is a movement

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7   This neologism is founded upon the word play based upon the double meaning of the French verb "deferrer" which can mean both "to differ" and to "defer." See "différeance" in: [Honderich 1995, p. 201].

8   The term "being" may be used as a reference to the subject of consciousness, in the special sense it is opposed to mere "objects." The term "being" (Dasein) was popularized by Martin Heidegger and has precisely the above sense. See "being" and "Martin Heidegger" in: [Honderich 1995, pp. 82, 345-349].

of becoming of meaning placed between processes of differing and deferring that make the meaning possible. Concepts defer multiple meanings without realizing them and by differing from something they are not they gain their identity. The nature of difference can be summed up in the following words:

> *Différeance* is not a concept, but that which makes concepts possible. It is not an essence, for it assumes a different form in each relation and does not exist before these [Derrida 1982, p. 382].

Trace is another term "invented" by Derrida, which represents dynamic, procesual nature of a text. In a way it may be perceived more fundamental to Derrida's model of textual language than the term "text" itself. This is so because the sole concept of writing is unshakable without some notion of chamfering, or removal of background. Yet for Derrida trace represents a dynamic process, in a sense that it is movement, in the same way as it is the effect of movement. It goes both into past and into future; at the same time preserving what is in the past and projecting what will be in the future. Similar to différeance, trace is wordplay. In French the word *trace* (which means exactly the same as in English) have an anagram *écart* which means distance, defection, space, or interval; this enables Derrida to express the dual nature of writing – it is both the making of the traces (as animals do for example on the snow) and at the same time delimits a certain space [Johnson 1995, pp. 58-59].

For Derrida, trace follows from the qualities of consciousness, which always contains something that has been left from its pervious state. It is impossible for the present state of consciousness not to have any relation with its state from the past. In a way the present state is a repetition of previous states. Therefore every consciousness, as the present content of itself, is a trace. This is what makes possible any language, science, and every other aspect of human activity that is, or appears to be, cumulative. If no complete self-presence in consciousness is possible, a question may be posed: what defines the identity of an expression in consciousness [Stocker 2006, p. 179]? For Derrida the answer is:

> If indication is not added to expression, which is not added to sense, we can nevertheless speak in regard to them as primordial "supplement": their *addition* comes to *make up for* a deficiency, it comes to compensate for a primordial nonself-presence [Derrida 1973, p. 67].

The "deficiency" is in other words the lack of origin – a situation in which meaning as presence is impossible. Stocker sums up this whole argument in the following claim about fundamental importance of these considerations for Derrida's thought:

> We have already seen how the origin can never be completely present for Derrida, and the idea of supplementarity is a consequence. The origin in never present, so what we have is always a supplement, as an addition or replacement. The sense in language cannot be the original expression as a pure idea in pure consciousness; it always requires the supplement of the indicative, of the word as spoken or written [Stocker 2006, p. 180].

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All three terms, iteration, différeance, and trace, shows certain conceptual similarities. This is so because they are all but various sides of one trembling, a deconstruction, and therefore it is very hard to distinguish them from one another by a strict definition. All of the terms are occupied with a temporal nature of meaning and language, which is a scene for it. All rest on certain dualities; all are in a sense paradoxes. Yet for the purpose of clarity in the task of presenting a Derridian framework for interpreting international relations texts, the terms that compose it should have the following meaning. Iteration will refer to the usage of a word or phrase in a sense that is different from its usual meaning outside a particular theory; différeance will refer to the situation in which an equivocal play of certain terms constitutes their meaning in its text; trace will denote a concept which has a proper meaning within theory only after a referral (often inexplicit) to similar earlier concepts from the intellectual tradition in which a theory is embedded. I want to ascertain that the attempts at a "second reading" of IR theories should not be a conscious deconstructions on the part of an interpreter. I would rather call it a "second reading" informed by Derrida's deconstruction; yet as such it may

be called that way. However, one should not reduce the meaning of a particular theory *ad infinitum*, as it should be done in a way that is fully faithful to Derrida's concept. This is so because I would argue that to understand theories of international relations and other texts within the discipline, to which task this framework is aimed, is much more important than to shatter its meaning altogether.

To conclude the argument presented in this paper, I would like to present the likely candidates that could be scrutinized using the above framework. By candidates I mean concepts, theories or beliefs that are present as texts within the discipline of international relations.

A good way to employ iteration based on interpretation is to look at the category of the disciplinal progress of international relations. Throughout many fundamental texts one may find a lot of referral to progress in the discipline as a desired effect of the said texts. The problem is with the definition of such progress – if it measurable, how empirical would it be? Such questions lead to the problem of definitions that may be or may not be inspired by philosophy of science, to which scientific progress is one of the most important subjects, especially in the second half of the twentieth century. One thing is the postulation of a disciplinal progress as a goal of some text; the other is to find such a definition that would enable the author to present his case as progressive in a coherent way.[9]

An interesting way to use a différeance as a guidepost to interpreting international relations texts is to look through its lenses on the category of change as it is present in structural theories of international relations or texts inspired by it. The proper definition and conceptualization of the term has long been a weak point of such theories. A closer reading of them with the aim of seeing how authors themselves struggle to give it a proper, empirical meaning and a meaning that is homogeneous throughout the whole text could give a reader an additional insight and understanding of the place

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9   I would argue that this problem is apparent in the work of [Vasquez 1998 (1983)], but unfortunately this should be presented in a different article. Suffice to say that the meaning of progress, as the author declares, is based upon the philosophy of science; the problem is that there is a mix of different ideas that do not form a coherent definition. Thus the meaning of progress in Vasquez's text is different to the usual meaning of the term as it is defined by philosophers of science.

that category of change wishes to play in structural theories, and the place that it actually occupies.[10]

The best possible candidate to be scrutinized using trace as a focus of investigation is the literature on globalization that is flooding the shelves of libraries in departments of political science or international relations. Is an older term, used in international relations literature, "interdependence" the predecessor of the present "globalization" as a definition of the process that has been happening since at least the second half of the nineteenth century? Are well-known problems with a proper definition of globalization rooted in the fact that the process itself is so complex, or are they based on the fact that globalization is interdependence in a new guise, and usage of the former creates its meaning on the latter's well-known meaning?

Although the above propositions are but a fraction of the possible uses of the proposed deconstructive frameworks, I hope that they, albeit sketchily, show the promise of a more grounded analytical approach to international relations texts. With that I hope that they could also provide a medium that could bridge the gap between mainstream and postmodern critique of classical international relations texts. After all I think that both sides of that divide could at least agree that a proper critique is what furthers our knowledge about the social world.

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